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Abstract
Many scholars argue that economic interdependence and more extensive economic ties be-
tween countries decreases the risk of violent conflict between them. However, despite con-
siderable research on the“capitalist peace” at the macro or dyadic level, there has been less
attention to its possible individual-level microfoundations or underpinnings. We argue that
public perceptions about economic ties with other states and the costs of conflict should
influence the expected constraints on the use of force for leaders. Actual high interdepen-
dence and potential economic costs may not suffice to create political constraints on the
use of force if people are unaware of the degree of interdependence, or fail to understand
the benefits of trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict. We examine the
linkages between individual perceptions about economic interdependence and their views
on conflict and peace through a survey experiment, where we ask respondents in Japan
about approval for belligerent actions in a territorial dispute with China, varying informa-
tion about economic ties. Our findings indicate that greater knowledge and information
about economic interdependence affects attitudes about territorial disputes and increases
support for peaceful solutions with China.
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The idea of a capitalist peace, where interdependence and open economies have a pacifying
effect on interstate conflicts, has returned to prominence after the Cold War and the growing
interest in the democratic or liberal peace (Friedman 1999; Schneider and Gleditsch 2013). In
this article, we shift from the conventional focus on the aggregate dyadic relationship between
trade and conflict to possible individual microfoundations. We argue that citizens’ perceptions
about economic interdependence and the benefits of trade influence attitudes towards the use
of force and thus the potential political constraints for leaders. We note that most postulated
mechanisms relating interdependence and conflict imply that mass public opinion and percep-
tions of opportunity costs can play an important role in shaping the incentives and constraints of
leaders on the use of force. This in turn means that whether interdependence constrains leaders
from using force depends not just on the actual degree of interdependence or likely opportunity
costs but also on public opinion and how widely economic interdependence is perceived.
We provide a first analysis of how individual perceptions about interdependence and the
benefits of trade affect attitudes on the use of force. We conduct a survey experiment in Japan
about respondents’ support for the government’s hypothetical belligerent action against China
in an ongoing territorial dispute where we vary information about economic interdependence.
Our results indicate that Japanese respondents are less likely to approve of belligerent actions
against China when provided with information on more extensive interdependence and likely
costs. Our study complements dyadic studies of economic interdependence, and highlights
how public perceptions of interdependence are an important and potentially in part independent
factor in understanding how opportunity costs of conflict can constrain the use of force.
Interdependence and Peace through the Lens of Public Opin-
ion
Many studies examine how more extensive and higher valued economic ties between coun-
tries can decrease the risk of militarized interstate conflict (see, e.g., Mansfield and Pollins
2001, 2003; Oneal and Russett 1997; Oneal, Oneal, Maoz and Russett 1996; Rosecrance 1986;
Rummel 1983, 1985; Russett and Oneal 2001). This line of research is of course not with-
1
out critics; Some question whether interdependence actually moderates conflict, or question
the direction of the causal arrow,1 while others debate the relative importance of interdepen-
dence against other liberal factors such as democracy.2 Still, most accept the basic finding
that economic interdependence and peace tend to go together, even if the specific mechanisms
producing the relationship remain more contested.
Most research so far focuses on aggregate interdependence at the state level and its implica-
tions for interstate conflict. However, whether the lay public perceives the importance of trade
interdependence and prefers peace is in our view essential for the underlying logic of many
arguments of the capitalist peace. Most arguments highlight objective opportunity costs, and
assume that greater expected economic costs of conflict will translate into political disincen-
tives to use force, since the benefits of trade will be lost in the event of a disruptive conflict (see
Anderton, Anderton and Carter 1999; Schneider 2014; Simmons 2002, 2005).
There is little dispute in modern economic theory about the welfare enhancing effects of
trade and voluntary exchange (see Copeland 2015, 19). However, this does not mean that the
benefits of exchange are obvious and easy to understand. Although Adam Smith (1979/1776)
emphasized the value of markets, trade between countries was commonly thought to be ben-
eficial only under absolute advantage until David Ricardo (1911/1817) developed the concept
of comparative advantage. In brief, Ricardo showed that trade could increase total welfare,
even if one party lacked an absolute advantage for any commodity, as long as the parties spe-
cialized according to their comparative advantage on goods they could produce relatively more
efficiently.
Research on interstate conflict has traditionally focused on states as unitary actors (high-
lighting either individual leaders or collectives acting as a unit), and a number of theoretical
models formalize the constraining effect on conflict of higher opportunity costs to states un-
der interdependence.3 Theories of constraints through opportunity costs can be extended to
1Barbieri (1996) argues that high economic interdependence increases the likelihood of interstate conflicts,
although other scholars have criticized her empirical analysis (Gartzke and Li 2003; Xiang, Xu and Keteku 2007).
Keshk, Reuveny and Pollins (2010) argue that it is primarily conflict which inhibits trade, and that the remain-
ing effect of dyadic economic interdependence on the likelihood of conflict is negligible. Barbieri, Keshk and
Pollins (2009) emphasize the impact of data and auxiliary assumptions on inferences on the relationship between
international trade and conflict.
2See, for example, the debate between Gartzke (2007) and Dafoe (2011).
3Some approaches highlighting signaling are skeptical of whether observable opportunity costs by themselves
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individuals by highlighting how actors with sufficient vested interests in maintaining trade and
avoiding conflict will seek to influence government policy. Opportunity costs that individuals
incur should create particularly strong incentives for leaders to avoid violent conflict when they
are held accountable through competitive elections, as leaders may lose office if trade disrup-
tion from conflicts affects their support base (Baum and Potter 2008; Russett and Oneal 2001).
However, the same incentives should also apply for many autocrats with high interdependence,
especially if core constituencies stand to lose economically from military conflict (see Weeks
2008).
The standard accountability model simply assumes that high economic opportunity costs
under interdependence will translate into political incentives to avoid conflict. There are a
number of factors that could undermine this. First, not all actors stand to gain from trade, and
those that do not may favor trade disrupting policies. The fact that trade is welfare enhancing
in the aggregate does not mean that the gains are equally distributed, or that all people care
exclusively about material benefits and welfare relative to other “national interest” concerns.
There is a large literature on special interest groups and trade policies that suggest possible
political challenges to free trade, although most of this line of research does not focus on the
implications for militarized conflict (see Hiscox 2006; Rickard 2012; Scheve and Slaughter
2001).4
Second, some actors may not be sufficiently sensitive to the implied economic costs to
be persuaded to oppose conflict. The perceived economic costs of conflicts also needs to be
considered relative to the widespread economic illiteracy detected in many empirical studies.
Caplan (2007) shows that the lay public often has a weak understanding of even basic economic
issues and dramatically different beliefs about the benefits of markets and free trade than pro-
fessional economists. Most individuals have at best weakly founded positions on trade, and
face difficulties in processing complex information. Lay respondents also tend to display a
suffice to decrease the risk of conflict. Morrow (1999) develops a formal model where higher trade reduces
the actors’ resolve for war, but interdependence has an indeterminate effect on the risk of conflict. Gartzke, Li
and Boehmer (2001) argue that greater interdependence allow states to demonstrate resolve without resorting to
military violence. However, these signaling theories do not dispute the existence of opportunity costs, and it is
precisely the opportunity costs that allow states to provide costly signals to demonstrate their resolve.
4In addition to interest groups, consumers may be opposed to free trade due to other reasons ranging from
consumer tastes and skills (Baker 2005), public health and safety concerns (Kono 2006) to sympathy for producers
(Naoi and Kume 2011), even if they stand to benefit from cheaper imported goods.
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consistent bias against foreigners, and even respondents that claim to be “pro-market” are often
skeptical about the alleged benefits of globalization and trade with “other countries.”
In addition to trade, citizens generally have a weak grasp of international affairs and facts.
Many Americans believe that more than a quarter of the national budget goes to foreign aid,
even though it only accounts for about 1% (Kaiser Family Foundation 2013), and Berinsky
(2007) shows that most individuals have a poor factual understanding of even major events such
as World War II and the Second Iraq war. There is also some evidence that public ignorance
goes together with systematic differences in policy preferences. Dropp, Kertzer and Zeitzoff
(2014) asked American respondents to locate Ukraine on a map after the 2014 conflict, and
found that only about 15% of Americans could locate Ukraine correctly. Moreover, the least
knowledgable respondents were also more likely to be in favor of military intervention, possibly
as a result of a more limited understanding of the consequences and likely costs.
Economic literacy and ignorance about foreign affairs is not limited to the so-called igno-
rant masses. Krugman (1995, 10) notes how many ideas completely inconsistent with standard
economic theory have become “the conventional wisdom among policymakers, decisionmak-
ers, and influential intellectuals.” In short, actual high interdependence and high potential eco-
nomic costs may not suffice to bring about constraints on the use of force if people are unaware
of the degree of interdependence, or fail to understand comparative advantage or the benefits
of international trade and the likely economic costs of disruptive conflict.
Rather than assuming that individuals have fixed or static attitudes and beliefs, we think
that it is useful to examine variation in beliefs and information about interdependence. Public
opinion will not promote either capitalism or peace if a large share of the population is either
unaware of or remains unconvinced of the benefits of trade with other countries. We argue that
individuals who perceive (or are told about) greater trade are more likely to become cognizant
of potential costs of conflict and thus reluctant to approve of the use of force. Conversely, indi-
viduals who either remain unaware of the extent of interdependence, or recognize few benefits
from trade, are less likely to consider opportunity costs a persuasive counter-argument against
the use of force.
Beyond variation in actual material interests, differences in public opinion could also arise
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from information and issue framing. Caplan (2007) highlights how economists are more likely
to be in favor of markets and free trade, while Irwin (2009) reports that individuals with more
education are more likely to be positive to free trade. The lay public is also susceptible to
whether experts present an issue in a positive or negative light. Hiscox (2006) finds that anti-
trade framing in a survey questionnaire lowers support for free trade, while endorsement of free
trade by economists substantially increases support for trade liberalization (see also Ehrlich and
Maestas 2010). Irwin (2009, 26) shows that respondents in polls are more willing to accept in-
creased international trade driven by anonymous forces such as advances in technology, but
hesitate to support trade driven by specific policy initiates such as free trade agreements. Taken
together, the literature on public opinion and trade suggests that the political role of interde-
pendence is unlikely to be fully contained by measures of actual interdependence, as many
individuals have little information about the true state of interdependence and costs if disrupted
through conflict.
We develop specific expectations on how differences in perceptions of economic interde-
pendence affect the willingness to support the use of force. We test these in an experiment with
Japanese respondents framed around a territorial dispute with China, where we can manipulate
the information respondents receive about trade interdependence and trace the impact of the
manipulation on support for belligerent policies. We believe that greater attention to differ-
ences in individual attitudes can help shed light on ambiguous findings in existing research and
help understand important historical trends. For example, claims that trade does not enhance
peace under different degrees of interdependence and more asymmetric interdependence may
reflect more differences in individual beliefs (see Barbieri 2002; Bell and Long 2014; Lu and
Thies 2010). Variation in the prevailing views on interdependence and peace could also help
account for the decline of violence (Pinker 2011), as a better understanding of markets and the
benefits of trade may have help lower the willingness to support force. Gat (2009) highlights
resource scarcity as the ultimate cause of war over history. However, whether resources are
considered “scarce” is not just a function of direct control, but also our ability to find sub-
stitutes and expand supply through trade. In particular, we may see a move from traditional
mercantilist conceptions of the national interest, highlighting direct resource control and ter-
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ritorial conquest, to more liberal conceptions of the national interest, highlighting trade and
lower support for the use of force (see also Holsti 2004).
Propositions
The capitalist peace proposition holds that higher economic costs of conflict under high
trade interdependence should deter conflict between states (Russett and Oneal 2001). How-
ever, there are at least three outstanding questions about how this may translate to the individ-
ual level. First, are individuals who are aware of trade interdependence between two countries
also more likely to oppose military action? Second, are there specific threshold levels of in-
terdependence — both in terms of quantity and quality — that must be reached to constrain
the willingness to endorse belligerent actions? Finally, does the negative relationship between
interdependence and conflicts depend on self-interest or national-interest? We are unable to
consider the third question explicitly here,5 but focus on the first two and develop propositions
about the conditions under which individual perceptions about trade lead to their policy prefer-
ences on international disputes and, more specifically, affect the willingness to support the use
of force.
As discussed above, one key feature of the capitalist peace argument is economic opportu-
nity costs. We expect that individuals who are aware of a trade relationship between two coun-
tries are less willing to use force to solve an international dispute due to anticipated economic
costs. By this logic, providing better information about the existence of trade interdependence
with another country should decrease support for the government to take belligerent actions
against that country. This constitutes our baseline hypothesis :
H1: Interdependence. Individuals who perceive that there is trade with a country are more
likely to oppose the government’s aggressive action against the trading partner.
The baseline hypothesis only relies on the existence of mutual trade between two countries,
5Mansfield and Mutz (2009) find that individual attitudes towards trade are driven more by individual percep-
tions of how the national economy is affected by trade rather than by material self-interest.
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and does not take into account variation in the magnitude or quality in the sense of what kind
of trade countries have. Scholars have argued in favor of different types of dyadic interdepen-
dence that could have different consequences for the likelihood of violent conflict, including the
degree of symmetry in trade dependence (see Barbieri 1996; Hegre 2004; Lu and Thies 2010;
Oneal and Russett 1999, 2001). Bell and Long (2014) argues that interdependence has different
impacts depending on the issues at stake. Based on this, we reason that individual respondents
may react to differences in the quality and quantity of interdependence. Our following hy-
potheses test more specific conditions under which individuals react to trade information and
formulate their policy preferences.
The first qualification pertains to the degree ot interdependence. Lu and Thies (2010) find
that we only observe a positive relationship between trade interdependence and peace when
trade interdependence is very high. This suggests that providing individuals information of
high trade interdependence should be more effective in activating economic cost-benefit con-
siderations and a fear of possible economic loss derived from an international dispute. Thus,
we expect that:
H2: High interdependence. Individuals who perceive that trade with a country is substantial
are more likely to oppose the government’s aggressive action against the trading partner than
individuals who perceive trade to be low.
Similarly, it is also possible that what activates individual fears of economic opportunity
costs is not just the current levels, but perceptions about trends and whether the implication of
conflicts for future gains are higher. Individuals who perceive that economic interdependence is
increasing should thus be more likely to perceive higher opportunity costs and oppose military
action. Thus, we expect that:
H3: Increasing interdependence. Individuals who perceive that trade with a country has in-
creased over time are more likely to oppose the government’s aggressive actions.
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The quality, not just quantity of trade, may carry additional weight with individuals. At
the macro-level, Dorussen (2006) argues that different commodities have different effects on
conflicts (see also Reuveny 2001; Reuveny and Kang 1998). In line with this, we expect that
individuals may perceive dependence on a trading partner to be more important if two countries
exchange crucial commodities and more likely to oppose aggressive actions as a result. Thus,
we propose the following hypothesis:
H4: Crucial vs. non-crucial trade. Individuals who perceive that trade with a country in-
cludes crucial commodities to their country are more likely to oppose the government’s aggres-
sive action than individuals who perceive trade to include non-crucial commodities.
Finally, we examine whether providing asymmetric (as opposed to symmetric) trade infor-
mation influences support for the government’s belligerent action. Tests of the dyadic capitalist
peace hypothesis often distinguish between the least and most dependent partner in a dyad
and reason that the least interdependent state will determine the most important constraints on
conflict. However, for individual perceptions about opportunity costs, it may suffice that re-
spondents know that they are dependent on a trading partner and will suffer opportunity costs,
even if the other states is relatively less trade dependent. Thus, we consider the following hy-
pothesis about asymmetric dependence:6
H5: Asymmetric dependence. Individuals who perceive that their country is dependent on
trade with another country that is less dependent on the trade relationship are more likely to
oppose the government’s aggressive action against the trading partner.
6We also examine the opposite situation in which a trading partner is dependent on the country in terms of
trade.
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Research Design
China and Japan: Economic Interdependence and Territorial Conflict
We believe that a survey experiment in Japan with reference to China provides an ideal
case to test differences attitudes towards conflict and individual perceptions about economic
interdependence. This allows us to study the impact of providing information about economic
interdependence on attitude in a setting where we have both high mutual interdependence and
pre-existing territorial conflicts that entail a high risk of escalation to crises and serious military
action.
Japan is an advanced capitalist economy, highly dependent on trade with other countries.
The volume of Japan-China trade is substantial; however, the diplomatic relationship between
the two countries is problematic and strained. The ongoing territorial disputes makes the rela-
tionship a classical case of perceived rivalry (Goertz and Diehl 2000; Thompson 1999, 2001).
Japan currently controls eight uninhabited islands within an area of about seven square kilo-
meters in the East China Sea. These islands — called Senkaku in Japan, Diaoyu in China, and
Tiaoyutai in Taiwan — are also claimed by China and Taiwan. In 2012, the Japanese gov-
ernment purchased and nationalized three of the islands from a private owner, which further
aggravated the strained diplomatic relationship between Japan and China.
Focusing on a case with actual conflicts and interdependence provides a realistic setting
for a survey experiment. Previous conflict has had clear and tangible economic effects. For
example, when the Japanese government announced its intention to nationalize the disputed
islands with China in 2012, Chinese consumers responded with a boycott of Japanese products.
Bilateral trade decreased by 3.9% in the following year, which was the first drop in trade since
the global financial crisis in 2008 (Japan Times, January 11, 2013). We surmise that Caplan
(2007)’s finding that respondents tend to be antagonistic to trade with countries perceived as
“more foreign” is even more prominent in a situation of ongoing territorial disputes and where
many people hold nationalistic views, as is the case in the rivalry between Japan and China.
In addition, since China is not a democracy, our study also allows us to examine effects of
capitalism or interdependence on individual attitudes towards the use of force against antago-
9
nists separately from any possible effects of respondents preferring to avoid violence against
countries that they see as democratic.
Survey Design
We designed a survey experiment to test our propositions on how information about eco-
nomic interdependence affects the attitudes of respondents to the use of force, and conducted
it with a nationally representative sample of adults in Japan in March 2015. The survey was
carried out online, with a random sample of 1,751 respondents recruited through Internet-based
sampling methods, by the survey firm Nikkei Research.
Before we explain our research design for the main survey experiment, we first show the
result of another survey experiment embedded in the main survey experiment. We conducted
this experiment to demonstrate that we examine a hard case, where many respondents in Japan
have strong antipathy towards China amid the rivalry and strained diplomatic relationship be-
tween the two countries (see Iida, Kohno and Sakaiya 2012). Specifically, in addition to in-
cluding simple perception questions about Chinese politicians and citizens, to deal with social
desirability bias, we adapted a version of Akerlof’s (1970) lemon market experiment, where re-
spondents are asked whether they purchase a PC from a Japanese trading company or Chinese
trading company (Yamagishi, Cook and Watabe 1998). The control group respondents are told:
Suppose that there is a foreign company X’s NEW laptop. A Chinese trading com-
pany A (based in Japan) sells this exactly same NEW laptop 1,000USD, while a
Japanese trading company B sells the same NEW laptop 1,500USD. Import cost is
zero and exchange rate will not affect the transaction.
They are then asked “From which company will you buy the new laptop computer? No
returns allowed.” By contrast, in the treatment group, we introduced uncertainty and switched
the words describing the laptop from “NEW” to “OLD.”7 If the respondents decide based on
simple economic cost/benefit analyses, they should be more likely to purchase a PC from the
Chinese company regardless of the groups. Alternatively, if the respondents make a decision
7We controlled for a possible Japanese customer’s attachment to a Japanese product by using “a foreign com-
pany X.”
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based on trust, those in the treatment group should be more likely to purchase an old PC from
the Japanese company, due to the added uncertainty over the reliability of the used PC (i.e.,
a possible lemon), while those in the control group should be more likely to buy a new PC
from the Chinese company without such concerns. However, given the prior high antipathy
against China among Japanese respondents, we expect that most will not conduct a standard
cost/benefit analyses or consider trust in quality of new versus old, but will purchase a PC from
the Japanese company under any scenario.
As can be seen from the results in Table 1, the uncertainty treatment does not change the
purchasing behavior of the respondents notably. More specifically, the table shows that over
70% of the respondents under either scenario prefer to buy the Japanese laptop, despite the
$500 price surcharge over the Chinese laptop. The difference between the treatment and control
groups is very small and not significant at the 1% level. This suggests that Japanese respondents
have rather nationalistic or mercantilistic views on commerce with China. Thus, it is likely to
be very difficult for information about economic interdependence between Japan and China to
induce changes in attitudes about conflict due to opportunity costs in this case.8 This supports
our claim that this constitutes a “hard” case, where it will be more difficult find evidence of
information on interdependence changing individual attitudes.
[Table 1 about here]
Next, our main survey experiment tests whether providing information about trade interde-
pendence to respondents really reduces support for belligerent action by the Japanese govern-
ment against China, depending on different trade interdependence scenarios. We exploit the
territorial dispute with China (i.e., the Senkaku/Diaoyu islands),9 and all respondents received
a hypothetical scenario about a government decision and asked whether they support or oppose
this. More specifically, all respondents were told that “Today, the Japanese government de-
cided to station SDF (self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” They were then
asked “Do you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?” on a 5-point scale: “Strongly
8The antipathy result from the lemon experiment is also consistent with a question we posed to respondents
about their feelings towards Chinese people and politicians, using a feeling thermometer from 0 to 100 (with higher
values more positive). The average rates for Chinese people and politicians were 27.5 and 17.8 respectively.
9Since no Japanese military unit was stationed on the islands at the time of the survey, any military action
could be reasonably considered as a belligerent action and an escalation of the conflict.
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agree” (5); “Somewhat agree” (4); “Neither” (3); “Somewhat disagree” (2); “Strongly dis-
agree” (1).10 As the Japanese government mainly uses coastal guards and do not have stationed
military forces to patrol the islands, the hypothetical decision should be enough to aggravate
the diplomatic and economic relationships between Japan and China.11
In each scenario, we also randomly inserted a message about trade interdependence, ma-
nipulated the degrees and types of interdependence following the hypotheses above, while the
control group received a scenario that did not mention trade between Japan and China. Com-
paring the respondents’ answers among groups with different levels of trade interdependence
should allow us to estimate the effects of perceived economic interdependence on disapproval
of belligerent acts in a conflict setting.
Table 2 shows the list of the treatment groups. First, we have the baseline treatment to test
H1 (i.e., economic interdependence vs. no economic information, T1). Second, we differenti-
ate the quantity of trade relationships to test H2 (i.e., high interdependence, T2a, and low in-
terdependence, T2b). Third, within the symmetric interdependence framework, we manipulate
the trend in interdependence and commodity types to test H3 (i.e., increasing trend, T3a, and
constant trend, T3b) and H4 (i.e., crucial commodity trade, T4a, and non-crucial commodity
trade, T4b).12 Finally, we switch between symmetric and asymmetric trade information (i.e.,
Japanese trade dependence on China, T5a, and Chinese trade dependence on Japan, T5b).13
[Table 2 about here]
10We also asked “On a binary scale of 0 (oppose) and 1 (support), do you approve of the Japanese government’s
decision?”
11Note that we intentionally tried to choose a relatively mild action by the Japanese government as some re-
spondents may worry that too strong action may result in an excessive Chinese counter-reaction (for example, they
may see as the worst case scenario a loss of the disputed island after Chinese invasion).
12The relative importance of specific commodities depends on the availability of substitutes (Ripsman and Blan-
chard 1996), and intra-industry versus inter-industry can pose different vulnerabilities (Peterson and Thies 2012).
Since respondents in this survey may be ignorant on the relative importance of commodities, we deliberately em-
phasize to the T4a group that one commodity is crucial to produce another commodity. For group T4b, we do not
link two commodities from both countries and choose commodities likely to be seen as labor-intensive and cheap,
suggesting less important trade ties. The crucial commodities example uses semiconductors from Japan, which
are key for the Chinese automobile industry, and aluminum from China key for the Japanese precision industry.
For non-crucial commodities, we use paper bags from China and cardboard from Japan.
13See Appendix B for full translated scripts and Appendix C for a figure of the treatment group summary.
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Other Covariates
Since the research design is experimental, the treatment variables should be fully exoge-
nous. However, we are also interested in whether some respondents are more likely to be
sensitive to the treatment and change their perception. To consider this, we also collected other
covariates, including gender, age, education level, income level, understanding of comparative
advantage, and the level of trust towards the Chinese. We also collected information about oc-
cupation, since we should expect from the Heckscher–Ohlin theorem that high-skilled workers
benefitting from trade interdependence will be more likely to oppose belligerent government
actions (see Schneider 2014). We also collected attitudes about protectionism and free trade.
Commenting on the famous Corn Laws, Ricardo (1815, 8) noted that “in the case of war, a
combination of the continental powers may derive us of their accustomed supply.” Thus, those
who believe in protectionism may be more likely to approve the government action despite
interdependence. Still, relying on the experimental design, the following analysis does not in-
clude the covariates, and conducts a simple t-test to examine a statistical difference between
two groups.14
Findings
Table 3 reports a breakdown of approval rates across all the treatment groups by each answer
and shows that a majority of respondents (59.4%) supported the government’s aggressive act,
that is the decision to station SDF’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands, and only 8.5% of the
respondents clearly opposed the decision. This is consistent with the high levels of antipathy
towards China demonstrated in the lemon market experiment. More specifically, for the control
group in which respondents did not receive any trade information, the mean approval score is
3.84, close to the category “Somewhat agree.” This suggests that without trade information,
respondents are, on average, more likely to support the government’s belligerent action.
[Table 3 about here]
14We show in Appendix A that randomization has succeeded in generating balanced across control and treat-
ment groups on relevant demographic indicators such as age, gender, education, income, as well as knowledge
level about trade.
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However, despite the baseline antipathy towards China, Japanese respondents reacted to the
trade interdependence treatment, and the treatment group decreases the score by 0.16. Using a
regression analysis with a t-test, Figure 1 indicates that respondents who received information
about economic interdependence with China were significantly more reluctant to endorse the
government’s belligerent action. This suggests that knowledge about the economic interdepen-
dence between Japan and China has a pacifying impact, which is consistent with H1 and in line
with a capitalist peace playing out on the individual level.15
[Figure 1 about here]
We then examine whether the quantity and quality of interdependence makes a difference.
We conduct a regression analysis with a separate treatment group to demonstrate the results
of t-tests. Figure 2 reports the results for H2, H3, H4, and H5. As the figure suggests, we do
not find statistically significant differences for neither the levels of interdependence (H2), in-
terdependence trend (H3), commodity types (H4) or dependence information (H5) on support
for the government’s decision. More specifically, Panel (a) reports that the treatment groups
who receive information about high and low volumes of trade interdependence are not statisti-
cally different (µˆT 2a = 3.68, SET 2a = 0.92; µˆT 2b = 3.66, SET 2b = 1.00). Panel (b) shows that
whether increasing or constant trends in bilateral trade has a similar effect on people’s support
for the government’s decision (µˆT 3a = 3.73, SET 3a = 0.88; µˆT 3b = 3.72, SET 3b = 0.95). Panel
(c) presents that two groups who receive information about crucial or non-crucial trade interde-
pendence are not statistically different (µˆT 4 = 3.65, SET 4a = 0.94; µˆT 4b = 3.70, SET 4b = 0.89).
Finally, panel (d) shows that whether a host country depends on a trading partner or vice versa
does not make a difference to people’s support for the government’s decision (µˆT 5a = 3.75,
SET 5a = 0.98; µˆT 5b = 3.76, SET 5b = 0.88).16
[Figure 2 about here]
15The result is similar even when we switch from economic interdependence to neutral economic information –
relative to the no information group, those who received any kind of information about trade reduces their support
to the government action to station SDF naval escorts (destroyers) on the Senkaku islands.
16We do not find significant results even when we use the control group as a reference category to estimate the
impacts of the asymmetric trade information.
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These non-findings on more complex variation in interdependence are consistent with the
idea that the lay public have limited knowledge of more complex facts and thus tend to use
heuristics and information shortcuts (Berinsky 2007; Irwin 2009). The initial finding combined
with the initial non-findings jointly suggests that individual perceived opportunity costs of con-
flict largely stem from interdependence itself, and do not vary clearly by the more detailed
conditions outlined in existing research. Some may wonder whether the significant result of
the first treatment could be due to a positive framing effect, derived from adding one more sen-
tence to the control group. However, the fact that the other treatments with similar wordings
fail to show significant results suggests that the effect comes from something else other than a
positive framing effect. Still, we stress that our findings may be partly due to idiosyncrasies of
the existing territorial conflict, and such variation could be more relevant in other settings.
Although the observed effect estimates for the more detailed interdependence treatments are
very small relative to the effect of the simple interdependence treatment,17 skeptics may wonder
whether the no-findings could be driven by low power to the reject the null, especially because
the sample sizes are relatively small. The sample size of the current analyses in Figure 2 is
(a) 323, (b) 345, (c) 468, and (d) 351, respectively, whereas the analysis in Figure 1 is based
on a sample of 1316. To investigate this, we conducted more formal power analysis to see
if the additional analyses had sufficient power to detect an effect of a similar magnitude to
that displayed in Figure 1, given the sample size used and the observed standard deviations.18
This translates into a standardized effect size/Cohen’s d of 0.2, which also corresponds to his
suggested lower value for social science or psychological research where the stochastic element
may be large (Cohen 1988). Although the power to reject the null at the 0.1 level is much higher
for the larger sample considered in Figure 1 (power >0.99), our calculations show that power in
the subsequent analyses with the more specialized conditions is consistently above 0.8, which
is usually considered adequate. The only exception to this is the sample considered for Panel
(a) in Figure 2, where power is 0.798, and thus formally below 0.8 if not rounded to two digits,
yet this is still very close to 0.8. Thus, even if the sample sizes are relatively small, it seems
17More specifically, we would need sample sizes above (a) 57,078, (b) 207,352, (c) 8,290, and (d) 214,512 for
the observed differences to be statistical significance at the 10% level.
18The observed standard deviations in our subsample range between 0.85 and '1, and our substantive conclu-
sion from these analyses do not change if we use the overall sd for the data or the maximum.
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unlikely that lower power due to the sample alone can be said to leave us at high risk of a type
II error, or that our conclusions drawn from these analysis are overlooking potentially large
substantive effects of the more complex variations in interdependence.
Of course, it may well be the case that the measures used in these experiments are not
ideal for detecting these differences, and it would be worthwhile to consider alternatives in
future research that may improve on possible weaknesses in our approach that we have failed
to appreciate. Another possible explanation for the no-findings is heterogeneity across the
groups in the sample, which, if present, could dampen the average treatment effect. It is also
possible that unobserved characteristics are not balanced across groups in a way that too would
affect the results. Finally, we have the usual problems of external validity and generalizations,
especially with regards whether the findings are representative for other populations or rivalry
situations. Future replications with other populations or other geographic settings may lead to
identify such sources and their potential effects.
Discussion and Conclusion
Despite extensive research on interdependence and peace as well as public opinion about
economic policy, little research so far has examined how individual perceptions or information
about economic interdependence affects attitudes towards conflict and approval for the use
of force. We have examined whether an appreciation of higher economic interdependence
with a particular state, and hence greater opportunity costs of conflict, makes people more
hesitant to endorse belligerent acts against that state. Using a survey experiment in Japan on
a hypothetical conflict scenario with China and drawing on an ongoing territorial dispute, we
find that individuals when provided information about economic interdependence become less
likely to support belligerent acts. This is especially noticeable since we examine attitudes in a
realistic climate of widespread antipathy and deteriorating diplomatic relationship between the
two states.
Our findings have strong implications for the prospects of a capitalist peace as well as some
of its possible limitations. As long ago as 1795, Kant (2010/1795, 27) argued that “[t]he com-
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mercial spirit cannot co-exist with war, and sooner or later it takes possession of every nation.
For, of all the forces which lies at the command of a state, the power of money is probably
the most reliable.” Although we find that highlighting economic interdependence can decrease
support for belligerent action, it is clear from the overall attitudes towards China in our sample
of Japanese respondents that support for belligerent action actually can be very high, even in a
situation of high interdependence. Hence, the commercial spirit still has some way to go in this
case, and we suspect that this will be the case in many other rivalries, even if interdependence
is high. Many have argued that globalization and free trade may not be secure if a largely ig-
norant public is persuaded by protectionists interests (Irwin 2009). High interdependence by
itself may not suffice to bring about peace if the public remains ignorant about independence or
its benefits, or provides greater representation to protectionist interests. Individual differences
in opinions about interdependence are an important variable that needs to be systematically
studied in different settings to understand the likely influence on government decisions and for-
eign policy. Finally, our experiment here disregards the role of institutions, or how responsive
decision making is to public opinion in the first place. In particular, a low responsiveness to
public opinion in foreign affairs in democracies or in autocratic states in general can obviously
reduce the possible pacifying effects of public perceptions of interdependence.
However, there is also room for fundamental optimism. Our study shows that framing and
informing people about the benefits of trade and likely costs of conflict can help decrease pub-
lic support for the use of force, even in a climate dominated by strong hostilities. A more
widespread commercial spirit can potentially decrease both contentious issues as well as in-
crease incentives to find peaceful solutions, and promoting economic literacy can in this sense
be an important avenue to a more peaceful world. The political incentives for conflict depend
in particular on the attitudes of influential individuals, and there is some evidence that these
appear to have undergone an important sea change in the present era of globalization, in ways
that are likely to have important limiting effects on the use of force, even if much of the gen-
eral public retain a willingness to support the use of force. Mueller (1999, 101) argues that
economics has reached a consensus on some basic essentials ideas, thus leading to Truman’s
proverbial call for a “one-handed economist,” and gained increasing recognition as a source
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of authoritative advice, with the result that “the random government officials . . . consulting the
random economist is likely to benefit from the encounter”. In this sense, support for free trade
seems better established among politicians and opinion leaders, and their influence can help
make free trade much less vulnerable than suggested by some skeptics. Autocracies are also
not immune to these influences. In this sense, our study can be seen as suggesting that eco-
nomic factors and a greater appreciation of the benefits of trade can help transform rivalries and
territorial conflict, and that rivalry termination may be possible even in the absence of major
political change in autocracies if we see a major transformation of attitudes and public opinion
(see Goertz and Diehl 2000, 214).
Although our study benefits from the strengths of a randomized experiment, we need to
acknowledge that any single experiment will have limitations. There may be particular issues
with the implementation of our study that have influenced our findings, and it would be helpful
to have replications of the study in other settings. Moreover, the current study cannot speak
to wether the differences that we find here are similar to what we would find among Chinese
respondents or “elite” respondents. In our view, the theory of commercial peace suggests that
economic literacy and an understanding of trade dependence and opportunity costs of conflict
can also be better developed among elites. Here, we stress again that we believe that the
test among Japanese respondents constitutes a hard test for identifying the effect of economic
interdependence information leading to less support for belligerent actions. Thus, the fact that
we find evidence among less sophisticated respondents is even more suggestive – if anything,
we would expect to see a stronger pacifying effect by interdependence stimulus among elites.
However, this is only a supposition at this point, worthy of further investigation, and we hope
our study can inspire research along these lines.
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Tables and Figures
Table 1: Lemon Market Experiment results
Chinese Company Japanese Company
New PC 218 (27.7%) 568 (72.3%)
Old PC 189 (26.9%) 514 (73.1%)
Total 407 (27.3%) 1,082 (72.7%)
Note: 262 respondents either did not want to answer the question or responded that they did not know.
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Table 2: Summary of Treatment Groups
Group Interdependence Trend Types
C NA NA NA
T1 Interdependence Information NA NA
T2a High Interdependence NA NA
T2b Low Interdependence NA NA
T3a High Interdependence Increase NA
T3b High Interdependence Constant NA
T4a High Interdependence NA Crucial commodity trade
T4b High Interdependence NA Non-crucial commodity trade
T5a Host’s Dependence NA NA
T5b Partner’s Dependence NA NA
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Table 3: Approval Rate of the Government Action to Send SDF Naval Escorts
Strongly agree
Somewhat
agree
Neither
Somewhat
disagree
Strongly
disagree
NA
Frequency 332 708 478 117 32 84
Percentage 19.0% 40.4% 27.3% 6.7% 1.8% 4.8%
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Figure 1: T-test: Interdependence information vs. No trade information
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Note: The dot shows a treatment effect and the bar indicates 90% confidence intervals.
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Figure 2: T-tests: Quality and Quantity of Economic Interdependence
(a) High vs. Low Interdependence
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Note: The dots show a treatment effect and the bars indicate 90% confidence intervals.
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Appendix
A Balancing Test
Table A: Balancing Test
C T1 T2a T2b T3a T3b T4a T4b T5a T5b
Sample size 180 1136 172 151 172 173 313 155 164 187
Age 45.05 45.45 44.84 46.12 44.79 45.49 45.30 46.42 45.99 44.95
Male 0.52 0.48 0.51 0.46 0.49 0.48 0.46 0.47 0.49 0.55
University 0.50 0.55 0.52 0.52 0.59 0.49 0.57 0.60 0.56 0.58
Income 2.98 2.99 3.06 3.03 2.97 3.10 2.98 2.79 2.96 2.93
Comparative advantage 2.71 2.73 2.70 2.65 2.79 2.70 2.76 2.72 2.80 2.64
Interdependence perception 0.58 0.58 0.57 0.64 0.53 0.59 0.58 0.59 0.56 0.59
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B Scripts
Control group (C)
“Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (self defense forces)’s
destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do you approve of the Japanese government’s
decision?”
Interdependence group (T1)
“For Japan, China is a trading partner, and for China, Japan is a trading partner
as well. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF (self defense
forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do you approve of the Japanese
government’s decision?”
High interdependence group (T2a)
“For Japan, China is the top trading partner, and for China, Japan is the top
trading partner as well. Today, the Japanese government decided to station
SDF (self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do you approve
of the Japanese government’s decision?”
Low interdependence group (T2b)
“For Japan, China is the 9th largest trading partner, and for China, Japan is
the 9th largest trading partner as well. Today, the Japanese government decided
to station SDF (self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do
you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
High interdependence, increasing trend group (T3a)
“For Japan, China is the top trading partner, and for China, Japan is the top
trading partner as well. In addition, the trade between Japan and China has
dramatically increased since 2008. Today, the Japanese government decided to
station SDF (self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do
31
you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
High interdependence, constant trend group (T3b)
“For Japan, China is the top trading partner, and for China, Japan is the top
trading partner as well. However, the trade between Japan and China has remained
stagnant since 2008. Today, the Japanese government decided to station SDF
(self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do you approve
of the Japanese government’s decision?”
High interdependence, crucial commodity group (T4a)
“For Japan, China is the top exporter of aluminum that is key for Japanese precision
industry, while for China, Japan is the top exporter of semiconductor that is
key for Chinese automobile industry. Today, the Japanese government decided
to station SDF (self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do
you approve of the Japanese government’s decision?”
High interdependence, non-crucial commodity group (T4b)
“For Japan, China is the top exporter of paper bags, and for China, Japan is
the top exporter of cardboard. Today, the Japanese government decided to station
SDF (self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do you approve
of the Japanese government’s decision?”
Host’s dependence group (T5a)
“For Japan, China is the 9th largest trading partner, while for China, Japan
is the top trading partner. Today, the Japanese government decided to station
SDF (self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do you approve
of the Japanese government’s decision?”
Partner’s dependence group (T5b)
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“For Japan, China is the top trading partner, while for China, Japan is the
9th largest trading partner. Today, the Japanese government decided to station
SDF (self defense forces)’s destroyers on the Senkaku islands.” “Do you approve
of the Japanese government’s decision?”
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C Illustrated Summary of Treatment Groups
Economic Treatments or Not
Control Economic Treatments
Dependence
(T5a vs. T5b)
Interdependence (T1)
(T2a vs. T2b)
Trends
(T3a vs. T3b)
Commodity type
(T4a vs. T4b)
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